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Abstract
We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix
may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix
Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum game is core to many
problems in statistics, optimization, and economics, and for a fixed game matrix this can be
easily reduced to solving a linear program. But when the payoff matrix evolves over time our
goal is to find a sequential algorithm that can compete with, in a certain sense, the NE of the
long-term-averaged payoff matrix. We design an algorithm with small NE regret–that is, we
ensure that the long-term payoff of both players is close to minimax optimum in hindsight. Our
algorithm achieves near-optimal dependence with respect to the number of rounds and depends
poly-logarithmically on the number of available actions of the players. Additionally, we show
that the naive reduction, where each player simply minimizes its own regret, fails to achieve
the stated objective regardless of which algorithm is used. We also consider the so-called bandit
setting, where the feedback is significantly limited, and we provide an algorithm with small NE
regret using one-point estimates of each payoff matrix.
1 Introduction
We consider a problem in which two players interact in a zero-sum game repeatedly. The payoff
matrix of the game is unknown to the players a priori, and may change arbitrarily on each round.
Our objective is to find competitive strategies that can achieve the Nash equilibrium of the game
with the average payoffs in the long term. This problem is a significant extension of the classical
learning setting in zero-sum games, where the underlying payoff matrix is often assumed to be fixed
or i.i.d. In contrast, we allow the payoff matrix to evolve arbitrarily in each round, and can even
be selected in a possibly adversarial fashion.
Zero-sum games [44, 53] are ubiquitous in economics and central to understanding Linear Pro-
gramming duality [4, 31], convex optimization [1, 3], robust optimization [11], and Differential
Privacy [22]. The task of finding the Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game is also connected to
several machine learning problems such as: Markov Games [40], Boosting [26], Multiarmed Bandits
with Knapsacks [9, 34] and dynamic pricing problems [23].
We formally define the problem setting in Section 1.1. We then highlight the main contributions
of this paper in Section 1.2 and discuss related works in Section 1.3.
∗This is an extended version of [19], a new section on training GANs has been added.
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1.1 Problem Formulation: Online Matrix Games
We start by reviewing the definition of classical two-player zero-sum games. Suppose player 1 has
d1 possible actions and player 2 has d2 possible actions. The payoffs for both players are determined
by a matrix A ∈ Rd1×d2 , with Ai,j corresponding to the loss of player 1 and the reward of player 2
when they choose to play actions (i, j) ∈ [d1]× [d2].1 We allow the players to use mixed strategies –
each mixed strategy is represented by a probability distribution over their actions. More specifically,
when Player 1 uses a mixed strategy x ∈ ∆d1 and Player 2 uses a mixed strategy y ∈ ∆d2 , the
expected payoff is x>Ay.2 Throughout the paper, we refer to the static zero-sum game as a matrix
game (MG), because the players’ payoffs are a bilinear function encoded by the matrix A. A Nash
equilibrium of this game is defined as any pair of (possibly) mixed strategies (x∗, y∗) such that
(x∗)>Ay ≤ (x∗)>Ay∗ ≤ x>Ay∗
for any x ∈ ∆d1 , y ∈ ∆d2 . It is well known that every MG has at least one Nash equilibrium [44].
The problem of finding an equilibrium for a MG can be reduced to solving linear programming
problems. In fact, [4] showed that the opposite is also true, every linear programming problem can
be solved by finding an equilibrium to a corresponding MG.
Now, we define a problem that generalizes the matrix games into an online setting, which we call
the Online Matrix Games (OMG) problem. Suppose two players interact in a repeated zero-sum
matrix game through T rounds. In every round t ∈ [T ], they must each choose a (possibly) mixed
strategy from the given action sets xt ∈ ∆d1 , yt ∈ ∆d2 . However, we assume that the payoff matrix
in OMG can evolve in each round, and the players have no knowledge of the payoff quantities in
that round before they commit to an action. Let {At}Tt=1 be an arbitrary sequence of matrices,
where each At ∈ [−1, 1]d1×d2 for all t = 1, .., T . For each round t, the players choose their mixed
strategies xt ∈ ∆d1 , yt ∈ ∆d2 before the matrix At is revealed. Then, player 1 (resp. player 2)
receives a loss (resp. gain) given by the payoff quantity x>t Atyt. Note that the payoff matrix At is
allowed to change arbitrarily from round to round and may even depend on the past actions of both
players. The joint goal for both players is to find strategies that ensure their average payoffs in T
rounds is close to the Nash Equilibrium under the average payoff matrix 1T
∑T
t=1At in hindsight.
More precisely, let us call the quantity∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
x>t Atyt −min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
x>Aty
∣∣∣∣∣ (1)
the Nash Equilibrium (NE) regret. This is a natural extension of the regret concept in typical online
learning or multi-armed bandit problems, which involve only a single decision maker. The primary
objective of the OMG problem is to find online strategies for both players so that, as T →∞, the
average NE regret (1) per round tends to 0 (i.e., the NE regret is o(T )).
We make some remarks about the choice of benchmark and the fact that the players must
update jointly despite the fact that they are playing a zero-sum game. In the following examples,
the comparator term minx∈X maxy∈Y
∑T
t=1 x
>Aty arises naturally and there is one decision maker
which chooses the actions of both players.
1. Online Linear Programming [5]: the decision maker solves an LP where data arrives sequen-
tially. This problem has real-world applications in ad-auctions. Using Lagrangian duality,
we can reduce this problem to an online zero-sum game (our setting), where player 1 chooses
1Throughout, [n] , {1, ..., n} for any positive integer n.
2Here, ∆d represents the unit simplex in dimension d: ∆d , {v ∈ Rd : ‖v‖1 = 1, v ≥ 0}.
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primal variables and player 2 chooses dual variables. Our benchmark corresponds to the
optimal solution of the offline LP.
2. Adversarial Bandits with Knapsacks [34]: this problem extends the classical Multi Armed
Bandit by adding a ‘knapsack’ constraint. Again, using a Lagrangian relaxation on the
knapsack constraint, this problem can be linked to the online min-max games that we study
(see Sec. 3.2 of [34]).
3. Generative Adversarial Networks [28]: GANs can also be viewed as a zero-sum game, where
the decision maker trains the generator and discriminator to find a Nash equilibrium. Al-
though our model cannot directly be used for GANs because they are nonconvex, it is another
example where both players may desire to update jointly. In Section 6 we explore this further.
In the paper, we consider the OMG problem in two distinct information feedback settings. In
the full information setting (Section 4), both players are able to observe the full matrix At at the
end of round t. In the bandit setting (Section 5), players can only observe the entry of At indexed
by (it, jt) at the end of round t, where it and jt are the actions sampled from the probability
distributions associated with their mixed strategies (xt, yt).
1.2 Main Contributions
In addition to introducing a novel problem setting, the main contributions of the present work are
as follows.
• First, we show that a natural “na¨ıve” approach, where each player simply aims to minimize
their individual regret, will fail to produce a sublinear NE regret algorithm, in the sense of
(1), regardless of the players’ no-regret strategies (Theorem 1).
• Second, in the full information setting, we provide an algorithm for the OMG problem that
achieves a NE regret of O(max{ln(d1), ln(d2)} ln(T )
√
T ) (Theorem 3). Note that the regret
depends logarithmically on the number of actions, allowing us to handle scenarios where the
players have exponentially many actions available.
• Third, we propose an algorithm for the bandit setting that achieves an NE regret of order
O((max{d1, d2})5/3T 5/6) (Theorem 5).
• Fourth, we show empirically how our algorithm can be used to prevent mode collapse when
training GANs in a basic setup (Section 6).
1.3 Related Work
The reader familiar with Online Convex Optimization (OCO) may find it closely related to the
OMG problem. In the OCO setting, a player is given a convex, closed, and bounded action set
X, and must repeatedly choose an action xt ∈ X before the convex function ft(x) : X → R
is revealed. The player’s goal is to obtain sublinear individual regret defined as
∑T
t=1 ft(xt) −
minx∈X
∑T
t=1 ft(x). This problem is well studied and several algorithms such as Online Gradient
Descent [54], Regularized Follow the Leader [2, 49] and Perturbed Follow the Leader [36] achieve
optimal individual regret bounds that scale as O(
√
T ). The most natural (although incorrect)
approach to attack the OMG problem is to equip each of the players with a sublinear individual
regret algorithm. However, we will show in Section 3 that if both players use an algorithm that
guarantees sublinear individual regret, then it is impossible to achieve sublinear NE regret when
the payoff matrices are chosen adversarially. In other words, the algorithms for the OCO setting
cannot be directly applied to the OMG problem considered in this paper.
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We now discuss some related works that focus on learning in games. [50] study a two player,
two-action general sum static game. They show that if both players use Infinitesimal Gradient
Ascent, either the strategy pair will converge to a Nash Equilibrium (NE), or even if they do
not, then the average payoffs are close to that of the NE. A result of similar flavor was derived
in [20] for any zero-sum convex-concave game. Given a payoff function L(x, y), they show that
if both players minimize their individual-regrets, then the average of actions (x¯, y¯) will satisfy
|L(x¯, y¯) − L(x∗, y∗)| → 0 as T → ∞, where (x∗, y∗) is a NE. [14] improve upon the result of [50]
by proposing an algorithm called WoLF (Win or Learn Fast), which is a modification of gradient
ascent; they show that the iterates of their algorithm indeed converge to a NE. [21] further improve
the results in [50] and [13] by developing an algorithm called GIGA-WoLF for multi-player nonzero
sum static games. Their algorithm learns to play optimally against stationary opponents; when
used in self-play, the actions chosen by the algorithm converge to a NE. More recently, [10] studied
general multi-player static games and show that by decomposing and classifying the second order
dynamics of these games, one can prevent cycling behavior to find NE. We note that unlike our
paper, all of the papers above consider repeated games with a static payoff matrix, whereas we
allow the payoff matrix to change arbitrarily. An exception is the work by [33], who consider the
same setting as our OMG problem; however their paper only shows that the sum of the individual
regrets of both players is sublinear and does not study convergence to NE.
Related to the OMG problem with bandit feedback is the seminal work of [25]. They provide
the first sublinear regret bound for Online Convex Optimization with bandit feedback, using a
one-point estimate of the gradient. The one-point gradient estimate used in [25] is similar to
those independently proposed in [29] and in [51]. The regret bound provided in [25] is O(T 3/4),
which is suboptimal. In [2], the authors give the first O(
√
T ) bound for the special case when
the functions are linear. More recently, [32] and [17] designed the first efficient algorithms with
O˜(poly(d)
√
T ) regret for the general online convex optimization case; unfortunately, the dependence
on the dimension d in the regret rate is a very large polynomial. Our one-point matrix estimate
is most closely related to the random estimator in [7] for linear functions. It is possible to use
the more sophisticated techniques from [2, 17, 32] to improve our NE regret bound in section 5;
however, the result does not seem to be immediate and we leave this as future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce notation and definitions that will be used throughout the paper.
2.1 Notation
By default, all vectors are column vectors. A vector with entries x1, ..., xd is written as x =
[x1; ...;xd] = [x1, ..., xd]
>, where > denotes the transpose. For a matrix A, let Aij be the entry in
the i-th row and j-th column.
2.2 Convex Functions
For any H > 0 we say that a function f : X → R is H-strongly convex with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖,
if for any x1, x2 ∈ X, it holds that
f(x1) ≥ f(x2) +∇f(x2)>(x1 − x2) + H
2
‖x1 − x2‖2.
Here, ∇f(x) denotes any subgradient of f at x. Strong convexity implies that the optimization
problem minx∈X f(x) has a unique solution. If H = 0 we simply say that the function is convex. We
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say a function g is H-strongly concave if −g is H-strongly convex. Furthermore, we say a function
L(x, y) is H-strongly convex-concave if for any fixed y0 ∈ Y , the function L(x, y0) is H-strongly
convex in x, and for any fixed x0 ∈ X, the function L(x0, y) is H-strongly concave in y.
2.3 Saddle Points and Nash Equilibra
A pair (x∗, y∗) is called a saddle point for L : X × Y → R if for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , we have
L(x∗, y) ≤ L(x∗, y∗) ≤ L(x, y∗). (2)
It is well known that if L is convex-concave, and X and Y are convex and compact sets, there
always exists at least one saddle point [see e.g. 15]. Moreover, if L is strongly convex-concave, the
saddle point is unique.
A saddle point is also known as a Nash equilibrium for two-player zero-sum games [45]. In a
matrix game, the payoff function L(x, y) = x>Ay is bilinear, and therefore is convex-concave. The
action spaces of the two players are X = ∆d1 and Y = ∆d2 , which are convex and compact. As
a result, there always exists a Nash equilibrium for any matrix game. The famous von Neumann
minimax theorem states that minx∈∆d1 maxy∈∆d2 x
>Ay = maxy∈∆d2 minx∈∆d1 x
>Ay. If Player 1
chooses x∗ ∈ arg minx∈∆d1 maxy∈∆d2 x>Ay and Player 2 chooses y∗ ∈ arg maxy∈∆d2 minx∈∆d1 x>Ay,
the pair (x∗, y∗) is an equilibrium of the game [44].
2.4 Lipschitz Continuity
We say a function f : X → R is G-Lipschitz continuous with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖ if for all
x, y ∈ X it holds that
|f(x)− f(y)| ≤ G‖x− y‖
It is well known that the previous inequality holds if and only if
‖∇f(x)‖∗ ≤ G
for all x ∈ X, where ‖ · ‖∗ denotes the dual norm of ‖ · ‖ [15, 48]. Similarly, we say a function
L(x, y) is G-Lipschitz continuous with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖ if
|L(x1, y1)− L(x2, y2)| ≤ G‖[x1; y1]− [x2; y2]‖.
for any x1, x2 ∈ X and any y1, y2 ∈ Y . Again, the previous inequality holds if and only if
‖[∇xL(x, y);∇yL(x, y)]‖∗ ≤ G
for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y .
Lemma 1. Consider a matrix A. If the absolute value of each entry of A is bounded by c > 0,
then the function L(x, y) = x>Ay is G‖·‖2L -Lipschitz continuous with respect to ‖ · ‖2, where G‖·‖2L =√
c
(√
d1 +
√
d2
)
. The function L is also G‖·‖1L -Lipschitz continuous with respect to norm ‖ · ‖1,
where G
‖·‖1
L = c.
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3 Challenges of the OMG Problem: An Impossibility Result
Recall that we defined the Online Matrix Games (OMG) problem in Section 1.1, where two players
play a zero-sum games for T rounds. The sequence of payoff matrices {At}Tt=1 is selected arbi-
trarily. In each round t ∈ [T ], both players choose their strategies before the payoff matrix At is
revealed. The goal is to find strategies under which the players’ average payoffs are close to the
Nash Equilibrium of the game with payoff matrix
∑T
t=1At.
Perhaps the most natural (albeit futile) approach to attack the OMG problem is to equip
each of the players with a sublinear individual regret algorithm to generate a sequence of iterates
{xt, yt}Tt=1. We gave a few examples of Online Convex Optimization (OCO) algorithms that guar-
antee O(
√
T ) regret in Section 1.3. However, if each player minimizes its individual regret greedily
using OCO, this approach only implies that
∑T
t=1 x
>
t Atyt − minx∈∆X
∑T
t=1 xAtyt = O(
√
T ), and
maxy∈∆Y
∑T
t=1 x
>
t Aty−
∑T
t=1 x
>
t Atyt = O(
√
T ).Notice that the quantity minx∈X maxy∈Y
∑T
t=1 x
>Aty
associated with the Nash Equilibrium in equation (1) does not even appear in these bounds. The
reader familiar with saddle point computation may wonder how the so-called ‘duality gap’ [18]:
maxy∈∆Y
∑T
t=1 x
>
t Aty − minx∈∆X
∑T
t=1 xAtyt = O(
√
T ) relates to achieving sublinear NE regret.
It is easy to see that the duality gap is the sum of individual regret of both players. In view of
Theorem 1 we will see that NE regret and the duality gap are in some sense incompatible.
In this section we present a result that shows that there is no algorithm that simultaneously
achieves sublinear NE regret and individual regret for both players. This implies that if both
players individually use any existing algorithm from OCO they would inevitably fail to solve the
OMG problem.
Theorem 1. Consider any algorithm that selects a sequence of xt, yt pairs given the past payoff
matrices A1, . . . , At−1. Consider the following three objectives:∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
x>t Atyt −min
x∈∆
max
y∈∆
T∑
t=1
x>Aty
∣∣∣∣∣ = o(T ), (3)
T∑
t=1
x>t Atyt − min
x∈∆X
T∑
t=1
x>Atyt = o(T ), (4)
max
y∈∆Y
T∑
t=1
x>t Aty −
T∑
t=1
x>t Atyt = o(T ). (5)
Then there exists an (adversarially-chosen) sequence A1, A2, . . . such that not all of (3), (4), and
(5), are true.
A full proof of the result is shown in the Appendix, but here we give a sketch. The main idea
is to construct two parallel scenarios, each with their own sequences of payoff matrices. The two
scenarios will be identical for the first T/2 periods but are different for the rest of the horizon. In
our particular construction, in both scenarios the players play the well known “matching-pennies”
game for the first T/2 periods, then in first scenario they play a game with equal payoffs for all of
their actions and in the second scenario they play a game where Player 1 is indifferent between its
actions. One can show that if all three quantities in the statement of the theorem are o(T ) in the
first scenario, then we prove that at least one of them is Ω(T ) in the second one which yields the
result. This suggests that the machinery for OCO, which minimizes individual regret, cannot be
directly applied to the OMG problem.
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4 Online Matrix Games: Full Information
4.1 Saddle Point Regularized Follow-the-Leader
In this section we propose an algorithm to solve the OMG problem in the full information setting.
In fact, we will consider the algorithm in a slighly more general setting than the OMG problem,
allowing the sequence of payoff functions to be specified by arbitrary convex-concave Lipschitz
functions, and the action sets of Player 1 and Player 2 (X ⊂ Rn and Y ⊂ Rn respectively) to be
arbitrary convex compact sets.
Let the sequence of convex-concave functions be {L¯t(x, y)}Tt=1, which are GL¯-Lipschitz with
respect to some norm ‖ · ‖. We propose an algorithm called Saddle Point Regularized Follow the
Leader (SP-RFTL), shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Saddle-Point Regularized-Follow-the-Leader (SP-RFTL)
input: x1 ∈ X, y1 ∈ Y , parameters: η > 0, strongly convex functions RX , RY
for t = 1, ...T do
Play (xt, yt)
Observe L¯t
Lt(x, y)← L¯t + 1ηRX(x)− 1ηRY (y)
xt+1 ← arg minx∈X maxy∈Y
∑t
τ=1 Lt(x, y)
yt+1 ← arg maxy∈Y minx∈X
∑t
τ=1 Lt(x, y)
end for
The regularizers RX , RY are used as input for the algorithm. We will choose regularizers that
are strongly convex with respect to norm ‖ · ‖, and GR1 and GR2 Lipschitz with respect to norm
‖ · ‖, which means that ‖∇RX(x)‖∗ ≤ GR1 for all x ∈ X, and ‖∇RY (y)‖∗ ≤ GR2 for, all y ∈ Y .
Finally, we assume RX(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and RY (y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y .
The main difference between SP-RFTL and the well known Regularized Follow the Leader
(RFTL) algorithm [2, 49] is that in SP-RFTL both players update jointly and play the saddle
point of the sum of regularized games observed so far. In particular, they disregard their previous
actions. In contrast, the updates for RFTL would be
xRFTLt+1 ← arg min
x∈X
t∑
τ=1
[
L¯τ (x, yRFTLτ ) +
1
η
RX(x)
]
yRFTLt+1 ← arg max
y∈Y
t∑
τ=1
[
L¯τ (xRFTLτ , y)−
1
η
RY (y)
]
for t = 2, ..., T , and xRFTL1 , y
RFTL
1 are chosen as to minimize RX(x) and −RY (y) in their respective
sets X,Y . It is easy to see that the sequence of iterates is in general not the same. In fact, in
view of Theorem 1 we know that RFTL can not achieve sublinear NE regret when the sequence
of functions is chosen arbitrarily. One last remark about the algorithm is that as T →∞ the last
iterates (xT+1, yT+1) will converge to the set of NE of the average game
1
T
∑T
t=1 L¯t. To see this,
observe that if η =
√
T then xT+1 ← arg minx∈X maxy∈Y 1T
∑T
t=1
[L¯t(x, y)]+ 1√TRX(x)− 1√TRY (y)
i.e. xT+1 solves the average problem where the regularization is vanishing, and a similar expression
can be written for yT+1. This is in contrast with many of the results mentioned in Section 1.3
where it is the average of the iterates which is an approximate equilibrium.
We have the following guarantee for SP-RFTL.
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Theorem 2. For t = 1, ..., T , let L¯t be GL¯-Lipschitz with respect to norm ‖ · ‖. Let RX , RY be
strongly convex functions with respect to the same norm, let GRX , GRY be the Lipschitz constants
of RX , RY with respect to the same norm. Let {(xt, yt)}Tt=1 be the iterates generated by SP-RFTL
when run on convex-concave functions {L¯t(x, y)}Tt=1. It holds that∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
L¯t(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x, y)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤8η
[
GL¯ +
1
η
max(GRX , GRY )
]2
(1 + ln(T ))
+
T
η
max
y∈Y
RY (y) +
T
η
max
x∈X
RX(x) = O
(√
T ln(T )
)
,
where the last equality follows by choosing η =
√
T
ln(T ) .
A formal proof of the theorem is provided in the Appendix and a sketch will be given shortly.
We note that the bound in Theorem 2 holds for general convex-concave functions, however the
dependence on the dimension is hidden on the Lipschitz constants and the choice of regularizer. It
is easy to check that if one chooses ‖ · ‖22 as regularizer, and the functions {Lt}Tt=1 are G-Lipschitz
continuous with respect to norm ‖ · ‖22, then the NE regret bound will be O(n ln(T )
√
T ).
We now provide a sketch of the proof of Theorem 2. Define Lt(x, y) , L¯t(x, y) + 1ηRX(x) −
1
ηRY (y). Notice that it is
1
η -strongly convex in x with respect to norm ‖ · ‖ for all y ∈ Y and
1
η -strongly concave with respect to norm ‖ · ‖ for all x ∈ X. Additionally, notice that Lt is
GL , GL¯+ 1η (GRX +GRY )-Lipschitz with respect to norm ‖ · ‖. Finally, notice that for t = 1, ..., T ,
all x ∈ X and all y ∈ Y it holds that
− 1
η
RY (y) ≤ Lt(x, y)− L¯t(x, y) ≤ 1
η
RX(x) (6)
The following lemma shows that the value of the convex-concave games defined by
∑T
t=1 Lt and∑T
t=1 L¯t are not too far from each other.
Lemma 2. Let
x¯T+1 ∈ arg minx∈X maxy∈Y
∑T
t=1 L¯t(x, y),
y¯T+1 ∈ arg maxy∈Y minx∈X
∑T
t=1 L¯t(x, y).
It holds that
− T
η
RY (y¯T+1)
≤ min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x, y)
≤ T
η
RX(x¯T+1).
To prove the NE regret bound, we note that SP-RFTL is running a Follow-the-Leader scheme
on functions {LTt=1} [36]. With the next two lemmas one can show that the NE regret of the players
relative to functions {L}Tt=1 is small.
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Lemma 3. Let {(xt, yt)}Tt=1 be the iterates of SP-RFTL. It holds that
−GL
∑T
t=1 ‖xt − xt+1‖
≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
≤ GL
∑T
t=1 ‖yt − yt+1‖.
Lemma 4. Let {(xt, yt)}Tt=1 be the sequence of iterates generated by the algorithm. It holds that
‖xt − xt+1‖+ ‖yt − yt+1‖
≤ 4η
t
[
GL¯ +
1
η
max(GRX , GRY )
]
.
Combining the NE regret bound obtained on functions {L}Tt=1 together with Lemma 2 and
equation (6) yields the theorem.
4.2 Logarithmic Dependence on the Dimension of the Action Spaces
Previously, we analyzed the OMG problem by treating the payoff functions as general convex-
concave functions and the action spaces as general convex compact sets. We explained that
in general one should expect to achieve NE regret which depends linearly in the dimension of
the problem. The goal in this section is to obtain sharper NE regret bounds that scale as
O(ln(T )
√
T ln(max(d1, d2))) by exploiting the geometry of the decision sets ∆X ,∆Y and the bilin-
ear structure of the payoff functions. This allows us to solve games which may have exponentially
many actions, which often arise in combinatorial optimization settings.
The plan to obtain the desired NE regret bounds in this more restrictive setting is to use the
negative entropy as a regularization function (which is strongly convex with respect to ‖ · ‖1), that
is RX(x) =
∑d1
i=1 xi ln(xi)+ ln(d1) and RY (y) =
∑d2
i=1 yi ln(yi)+ ln(d2) where the extra logarithmic
terms ensure RX , RY are nonnegative everywhere in their respective simplexes. Unfortunately,
the negative entropy is not Lipschitz over the simplex, so we can not leverage our result from
Theorem 2. To deal with this challenge, we will restrict the new algorithm to play over a restricted
simplex:3
∆θ = {z ∈ Rd : ‖z‖1 = 1, zi ≥ θ, i = 1, ..., d}. (7)
The tuning parameter θ ∈ [0, 1/d] used for the algorithm will be defined later in the analysis.
(Notice that when θ > 1/d, the set is empty.) We have the following result.
Lemma 5. The function R(x) ,
∑d
i=1 xi ln(xi) is GR-Lipschitz continuous with respect to ‖ · ‖1
over ∆θ with GR = max{| ln(θ)|, 1}.
The algorithm Online-Matrix-Games Regularized-Follow-the-Leader is an instanti-
ation of SP-RFTL with a particular choice of regularization functions, which are nonegative and
Lipschitz over the sets ∆X,θ, ∆Y,θ. With this, we can prove a NE regret bound for the OMG
problem. For the remainder of the paper, the regularization functions will be set as follows:
RX(x) ,
∑d1
i=1 xi ln(xi) + ln(d1),
RY (y) ,
∑d2
i=1 yi ln(yi) + ln(d2).
We have the following guarantee for OMG-RFTL.
3We will also use the notation ∆X,θ and ∆Y,θ to mean the restricted simplex of Player 1 and 2, respectively
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Algorithm 2 Online-Matrix-Games Regularized-Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (OMG-RFTL)
input: x1 ∈ ∆X,θ ⊂ Rd1 , y1 ∈ ∆Y,θ ⊂ Rd2 , parameters: η > 0, θ < min{ 1d1 , 1d2 }.
for t = 1, ...T do
Play (xt, yt), observe matrix At
L¯t ← x>Aty
Lt(x, y)← L¯t + 1ηRX(x)− 1ηRY (y)
xt+1 ← arg minx∈∆X,θ maxy∈∆Y,θ
∑t
τ=1 Lt(x, y)
yt+1 ← arg maxy∈∆Y,θ minx∈∆X,θ
∑t
τ=1 Lt(x, y)
end for
Theorem 3. Let {At}Tt=1 be an arbitrary sequence of matrices with entries bounded between [−1, 1].
Let GL¯ be the Lipschitz constant (with respect to ‖ · ‖1) of L¯t , x>Aty for t = 1, ..., T . Let
{(xt, yt)}Tt=1 be the iterates of OMG-RFTL) and choose θ = e−ηGL¯ ≤ min{ 1d1 , 1d2 } such that
| ln(θ)|
η = GL¯. Set η =
√
T
GL¯
. It holds that∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
x>t Atyt −min
x∈∆
max
y∈∆
T∑
t=1
x>Aty
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 32GL¯
√
T (1 + ln(T )) + 2
√
T max{ln d1, ln d2}+
2 max{d1, d2}GL¯Te−
√
T
= O
(
ln(T )
√
T +
√
T max{ln d1, ln d2}
)
+
o(1) max{d1, d2}.
A full proof of the theorem can be found in the Appendix. We now give a sketch of the proof.
Since the algorithm selects actions over the restricted simplex, we must quantify the potential loss
in the NE regret bound imposed by this restriction. The next two lemmas make this precise.
Lemma 6. Let z∗ ∈ ∆ ⊂ Rd define z∗p , arg minz∈∆θ ‖z − z∗‖1, with θ ≤ 1d . Notice z∗p is unique
since it is a projection. It holds that ‖z∗p − z∗‖1 ≤ 2θ(d− 1).
Lemma 7. Let {L¯t(x, y)}Tt=1 be an arbitrary sequence of convex-concave functions, L¯t : ∆X×∆Y →
R, that are GL¯-Lipschitz with respect to ‖ · ‖1. With ∆X ⊆ Rd1, and ∆Y ⊆ Rd2. It holds that
−GL¯T‖x∗p − x∗‖1
≤ min
x∈∆
max
y∈∆
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x, y)− min
x∈∆θ
max
y∈∆θ
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x, y)
≤ GL¯T‖y∗p − y∗‖1.
Combining the previous two lemmas and Theorem 2, one can show the NE regret bound for
OMG-RFTL holds.
5 Online Matrix Games: Bandit Feedback
In this section we focus on the OMG problem under bandit feedback. In this setting, the players
observe in every round only the payoff corresponding to the chosen actions. If Player 1 chooses
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action i, Player 2 chooses action j, and the payoff matrix at that time step is At, then the players
observe only (At)ij instead of the full matrix At. The limited feedback makes the problem sig-
nificantly more challenging than the full information one: the players must find a way to exploit
(use all previous information to try to play a Nash Equilibrium) and explore (try to estimate At
in every round). This problem resembles that of Online Bandit Optimization [7, 17, 25, 32], while
the main difference is that with one function evaluation we must estimate a matrix At instead of
the gradients ∇xLt(x, y) and ∇yLt(x, y) where Lt = x>Aty.
Before proceeding we establish some useful notation. For i = 1, ..., d, let ei ∈ Rd be the collection
of standard unit vectors i.e. ei is the vector that has a 1 in the i-th entry and 0 in the rest. Let
ex,t be the standard unit vector corresponding to the decision made by Player 1 for round t, define
ey,t similarly. Notice that under bandit feedback, in round t both players only observe the quantity
e>x,tAtey,t.
5.1 A One-Point Estimate for L(x, y) = x>Ay
As explained previously, in each round t the players must estimate At by observing only one of its
entries. To this end, we allow the players to share with each other their decisions and to randomize
jointly (a similar assumption is used to define correlated equilibria in zero-sum games, see [8]). The
following result shows how to build a random estimate of A by observing only one of its entries.
Theorem 4. Let x ∈ ∆X,δ, y ∈ ∆Y,δ with d1, d2 ≥ 2 and δ > 0. Sample i′ ∼ x, j′ ∼ y. Let Aˆ be the
d1 × d2 matrix with Aˆi,j = 0 for all i, j such that i 6= i′ and j 6= j′ and Aˆi′,j′ = Ai′,j′x(i′)y(j′) . It holds
that
Ei′∼x,j′∼y[Aˆ] = A.
5.2 Bandit Online Matrix Games RFTL
We now present an algorithm that ensures sublinear (i.e. o(T )) NE regret under bandit feedback for
the OMG problem that holds against an adaptive adversary. By adaptive adversary, we mean that
the payoff matrices At can depend on the players’ actions up to time t−1; in particular, we assume
the adversary does not observe the actions chosen by the players for time period t when choosing
At. We consider an algorithm that runs OMG-RFTL on a sequence of functions Lˆt , x>Aˆty,
where Aˆt is the unbiased one-point estimate of At derived in Theorem 4. Recall that the iterates
of OMG-RFTL algorithm are distributions over the possible actions of both players. In order to
generate the estimate Aˆt, both players will sample an action from their distributions and weigh
their observation with the inverse probability of obtaining that observation.
We have the following guarantee for Bandit-OMG-RFTL.
Theorem 5. Let {At}Tt=1 be any sequence of payoff matrices chosen by an adaptive adversary.
Let {ex,t, ey,t}Tt=1 be the iterates generated by Bandit-OMG-FTRL. Setting δ = 1T 1/6 , η = T 1/6
ensures ∣∣∣∣∣E
[
T∑
t=1
e>x,tAtey,t −min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
x>Aty
]∣∣∣∣∣
≤O((d1 + d2) ln(T )T 5/6)
where the expectation is taken with respect to randomization in the algorithm.
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Algorithm 3 Bandit Online-Matrix-Games Regularized-Follow-the-Leader (Bandit-OMG-
RFTL)
input: x1 ∈ ∆X,δ ⊂ Rd1 , y1 ∈ ∆Y,δ ⊂ Rd2 , parameters: η > 0, 0 < δ < min{ 1d1 , 1d2 }.
for t = 1, ...T do
Sample independently ex,t ∼ x˜t and ey,t ∼ y˜t
Observe e>x,tAtey,t
Build Aˆt as in Theorem 4 using e
>
x,tAtey,t, xt, yt
Lˆt ← x>Aˆty
Lt(x, y)← Lˆt + 1ηRX(x)− 1ηRY (y)
xt+1 ← arg minx∈∆X,θ maxy∈∆Y,θ
∑t
τ=1 Lt(x, y)
yt+1 ← arg maxy∈∆Y,θ minx∈∆X,θ
∑t
τ=1 Lt(x, y)
end for
We now give a sketch of the proof. The total payoff given to each of the players is given by∑T
t=1 e
>
x,tAtey,t so we must relate this quantity to the iterates {xt, yt}Tt=1 of OMG-RFTL when
run on sequence of matrices {Aˆt}Tt=1. The following two lemmas will allow us to do so.
Lemma 8. Let {ex,t, ey,t}Tt=1 be the sequence of iterates generated by Bandit-OMG-RFTL. It
holds that
E
[∑T
t=1 e
>
x,tAtey,t
]
= E
[∑T
t=1 x
>
t Atyt
]
,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the internal randomness of the algorithm.
Lemma 9. It holds that
E
[∑T
t=1 x
>
t Aˆtyt
]
= E
[∑T
t=1 x
>
t Atyt
]
,
where the expectation is with respect to all the internal randomness of the algorithm.
We will then bound the difference between the comparator term minx∈∆ maxy∈∆
∑T
t=1 x
>Aty
and the comparator term Theorem 3 gives us by running OMG-RFTL on functions {Lˆ}Tt=1,
minx∈∆ maxy∈∆
∑T
t=1 x
>Aˆty. Special care must be taken to ensure this difference holds even against
an adaptive adversary. To this end, we use the next two lemmas; in particular, the proof of Lemma
11 relies heavily on Theorem 4.
Lemma 10. With probability 1 it holds that∣∣∣∣∣ minx∈∆δX maxy∈∆δY
T∑
t=1
x>Aty − min
x∈∆δX
max
y∈∆δY
T∑
t=1
x>Aˆty
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∥∥∥∑Tt=1Aty − Aˆty∥∥∥
2
.
Lemma 11. It holds that
E
[∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
Aty − Aˆty
∥∥∥∥∥
2
]
≤ 2
√
T min(d1, d2)
δ2
,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the internal randomness of the algorithm.
The proof of Theorem 5 follows by combining Lemmas 8 through 11, with careful choice of
tuning parameters.
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6 Training Generative Adversarial Networks
In this section we use our ideas to train Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [28].
6.1 GAN Formulation
GANs are particular approach to generative modeling. A generative model is is a machine learning
model that takes samples drawn from an unknown distribution pdata and learns to represent an
estimate of that distribution. After training, the model outputs a distribution pmodel or some way
to generate samples from it [27]. A GAN can be though of as two neural networks, the generator
G and the discriminator D, playing a game against each other. The goal of the generator is to
create samples from pmodel that look like samples from pdata, and the goal of the discriminator is
to recognize if a given sample comes from pdata or if it is a fake sample generated by its adversary.
The original GAN formulation from [28] poses the problem as finding a solution to
min
G
max
D
Ex∼pdata(x)[log(D(x))] + Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]. (8)
Here pz(z) is some noise distribution that G maps onto the data space. Generative models have
plenty of applications in other areas of machine learning, for example: reinforcement learning [24],
semi-supervised learning [47, 52], single image super resolution [39], image-to-image translation
[35], and even art creation [16], just to mention a few.
6.2 Mode Collapse
The most natural approach to train a GAN (and the original one used in [28]), is to simultaneously
perform gradient descent on the generator’s parameters and gradient ascent on those of the discrim-
inator. However, it has been shown that even in simple convex-concave games such as L(x, y) = xy,
if one performs gradient descent on x and gradient ascent on y the dynamics do not necessarily
converge to the Nash Equilibrium (see Ch. 5 of [27] ). So it should not be surprising to observe
that serious problems arise while training a GAN. We say a GAN suffered from mode collapse if the
generator ends up producing samples from only a few modes from the distribution pdata, visually
it means that the generator produces samples with low diversity. The first row in Figure 1 shows
a clear example of this.
Since the introduction of GANs there has been an incredible effort from the machine learning
community to understand why mode collapse occurs and how to fix it. In a very recent large-scale
study [41], many GAN models were thoroughly tested to see if one outperformed the others. Their
conclusion was “we did not find evidence that any of the tested algorithms consistently outperforms
the non-saturating GAN introduced in [28]”. The algorithms/models tested in the aforementioned
study were: MM-GAN [28], NS-GAN [28], WGAN [6], WGAN GP [30], LS GAN [42], DRAGAN
[38] and BEGAN [12].
The algorithm for training the non-saturating GAN from [28] corresponds to running two sublin-
ear individual regret algorithms in parallel, one for the generator and another for the discriminator.
However, it is common to observe mode collapse using this training procedure. In view of Theo-
rem 1 we tested a variant of SP-RFTL on this setting hoping for significantly different training
dynamics.
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6.3 SP-RFTL for Training GANs
Even though the original GAN formulation, Equation 8, is not convex-concave we tested a variant
of SP-RFTL on this setting. The particular implementation consists on 1) taking a mini-batch of
data from pdata with N samples to approximate the payoff function in Equation 8 with
Lt(G,D) = 1
N
N∑
n=1
log(D(xn)) + Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))],
2) simultaneously run a sublinear individual Regret algorithm on the generator’s parameters and
another one on the discriminator’s parameters for a fixed number of iterations and 3) uniformly
average the iterates of both algorithms. Then we sample a new mini-batch of data from pdata to
obtain Lt+1 and repeat the procedure. If the payoff function Lt were convex-concave then the
combination of steps 2) and 3) would be equivalent to finding an approximate NE for Lt. It is easy
to see that the procedure just described follows the spirit of SP-RFTL where both RX , RY are set
to any constant function. The reason for this is that the sequence Lt is stochastic (not adversarial)
and thus regularization is not necessary.
6.4 Experiments
In Figure 1 we compare our proposed algorithm SP-RFTL with: Unrolled GAN [43], Wassertein
GAN [6], and Wassertein GAN with Gradient Clipping [30]. The dataset is a mixture of eight gaus-
sians placed uniformly in a circle of radius two with variance .02. The generator and discriminator
architectures for Unrolled 0, Unrolled 4, and SP-RFTL are identical to those in Appendix A from
[43]. The optimization parameters for Unrolled 0 and Unrolled 4 are the ones suggested in [43]. The
optimization parameters for SP-RFTL are the same as for Unrolled 0, the extra parameter that
controls how often we average the iterates was tuned by visual inspection. The WGAN and WGAN-
GC architectures and parameters are exactly the ones provided in [30]. WGAN and WGAN-GC
use an extra fully connected hidden layer compared to Unrolled 0, Unrolled 4, and SP-RFTL, we
did not change the architecture assuming [30] did their best effort to produce their original results.
All the algorithms use Adam [37, 46] as an optimizer. All the experiments were run on a Mac-Book
Pro with processor 3.1 GHz Intel Core i7, and 16 GB of RAM. In particular, no GPU was used.
All the code for this project can be found at https://github.com/adrianriv/gans-mode-collapse.
We judge the performance of the generator based on the quality of its samples. From Figure 1
it is obvious that SP-RFTL learns the correct underlying distribution in the shortest amount of
time. A final remark is that Unrolled 0 corresponds to running two no-individual regret algorithms
in parallel, which results in mode collapse. Interestingly, SP-RFTL the algorithm with best per-
formance, is doing exactly the same with the difference that it is averaging its iterates every fixed
number of rounds.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered the Online Matrix Games problem, where two players interact in a
sequence of zero-sum games with arbitrarily changing payoff matrices. The goal for both players is to
achieve small Nash Equilibrium (NE) regret, that is, the players want to ensure their average payoffs
over T rounds are close to those in the NE of the mean payoff matrix in hindsight. While it is known
that standard Online Convex Optimization algorithms such as Online Gradient Descent can be
used to find approximate equilibria in static zero-sum games, our impossibility result shows that no
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Figure 1: Comparison of algorithms in the mixture of 8 gaussians dataset. Each image shows the
probability density produced by the generator after x seconds (CPU time) of training. It is clear
that SP-RFTL (in red) outperforms all other algorithms.
algorithm for online convex optimization can achieve sublinear Nash Equilibrium regret (o(T )) when
the sequence of payoffs are chosen arbitrarily. We then design and analyze algorithms that achieve
sublinear NE regret for the Online Matrix Games problem, under both full information feedback and
bandit feeback settings. In the full information case, the performance of the algorithm is optimal
with respect to the number of rounds (up to logarithm factors) and depends logarithmically on the
number of actions of each player. For the bandit feedback setting, we provide an algorithm with
sublinear NE regret using a one-point matrix estimate. Lastly, we test our algorithm for training
GANs on a basic setup and obtain satisfactory results.
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. We assume there exists an algorithm such that
|∑Tt=1 x>t Atyt−minx∈X maxy∈Y ∑Tt=1 x>Aty| ≤ o(T ), ∑Tt=1 x>t Atyt−minx∈∆X∑Tt=1 x>Atyt ≤
o(T ), and maxy∈∆Y
∑T
t=1 x
>
t AT y −
∑T
t=1 x
>
t Atyt ≤ o(T ) for all possible sequences of matrices
{At}Tt=1 with bounded entries between [−1, 1]. We now construct two sequences of functions for
which all the three guarantees hold and lead that to a contradiction. Let T be divisible by 2.
In scenario 1: At =
[
1 −1
−1 1
]
for 1 ≤ t ≤ T2 and At =
[
0 0
0 0
]
for T2 < t ≤ T . In scenario 2:
At =
[
1 −1
−1 1
]
for 1 ≤ t ≤ T2 and At =
[
1 −1
1 −1
]
for T2 < t ≤ T . It is easy to see that for both
scenarios it holds that minx∈X maxy∈Y
∑T
t=1 x
>Aty = 0. Since d1 = d2 = 2 and we can parametrize
any x ∈ ∆X as x = [α; 1−α] and any y ∈ ∆Y as y = [β; 1−β] for some 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1. By assumption
we have that maxy∈∆Y
∑T
t=1 x
>
t Aty − minx∈X maxy∈Y
∑T
t=1 x
>Aty ≤ o(T ) for all sequences of
matrices {At}Tt=1. This implies for scenario 1 that max0≤β≤1
∑T
2
t=1 4αtβ−2β+1−2αt ≤ o(T ) which
also implies that
∑T
2
t=1 2αt − 1 ≤ o(T ) and
∑T
2
t=1 1− 2αt ≤ o(T ) since
∑T
2
t=1 4αtβ − 2β + 1− 2αt is
a linear function of β and thus its maximum occurs at β = 0 or β = 1.
For scenario 2 maxy∈∆Y
∑T
t=1 x
>
t Aty −minx∈X maxy∈Y
∑T
t=1 x
>Aty ≤ o(T ) reduces to
max0≤β≤1
∑T
2
t=1 4αtβ−2β+ 1−2αt+ T2 (2β−1) ≤ o(T ) which implies
∑T
2
t=1 2αt−1 + T2 ≤ o(T )
and
∑T
2
t=1 1 − 2αt + T2 ≤ o(T ). Finally, notice that
∑T
2
t=1 2αt − 1 + T2 ≤ o(T ) implies T2 ≤ o(T ) +∑T
2
t=1 1−2αt but from scenario 1 we have that
∑T
2
t=1 1−2αt ≤ o(T ) since T2 ≤ o(T ) is a contradiction
we get the result.
Proof of Lemma 1. We omit the subscript t.
‖∇x>Ay‖2 =
∥∥∥∥[∇xx>Ay∇yx>Ay
]∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

A>[1,:]y
...
A>[d1,:]y
A>[:,1]x
...
A>[:,d2]x

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
A>[1,:]y...
A>[d1,:]y

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
A>[:,1]x...
A>[:,d2]x

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
√√√√ d1∑
i=1
(A>[i,:]y)
2 +
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
A>[:,1]x...
A>[:,d2]x

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
√
d1(‖A[i,:]‖∞‖y‖1)2 +
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
A>[:,1]x...
A>[:,d2]x

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
by Generalized Cauchy Schwartz
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≤
√
cd1 +
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
A>[:,1]x...
A>[:,d2]x

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
√
cd1 +
√
cd2. (using the same reasoning)
The second part of the claim follows by bounding ‖∇x>Ay‖∞ using the same argument.
Proof of Lemma 2.
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) =
T∑
t=1
[L¯t(xT+1, yT+1) + 1
η
RX(xT+1)− 1
η
RY (yT+1)]
≤
T∑
t=1
[L¯t(x¯T+1, yT+1) + 1
η
RX(x¯T+1)− 1
η
RY (yT+1)] by Equation (2)
≤
T∑
t=1
[L¯t(x¯T+1, y¯T+1) + 1
η
RX(x¯T+1)− 1
η
RY (yT+1)] by Equation (2)
= min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
[L¯t(x, y) + T
η
RX(x¯T+1)− T
η
RY (yT+1)]
≤ min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x, y) + T
η
RX(x¯T+1).
The other inequality can be obtained by a similar argument.
Proof of Lemma 3. We first prove the second inequality. We proceed by induction. The base case
t = 1 holds by definition of (x2, y2), indeed
L1(x2, y2) +GL‖y1 − y2‖ ≥ L1(x2, y2) := min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
L1(x, y).
We now assume the following claim holds for T − 1:
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) ≥
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1)−GL
T−1∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖, (9)
and show it holds for T .
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
=
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xT+1, yT+1) + LT (xT+1, yT+1)
≥
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xT+1, yT ) + LT (xT+1, yT ) by Equation (2)
≥
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xT , yT ) + LT (xT+1, yT ) by Equation (2)
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≥
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1)−GL
T−1∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖+ LT (xT+1, yT ) by Equation (9)
=
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1)−GL
T−1∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖+ LT (xT+1, yT )− LT (xT+1, yT+1)
≥
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1)−GL
T−1∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖ −GL‖yT − yT+1‖
=
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1)−GL
T∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖.
We now show by induction that
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) ≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1) +GL
T∑
t=1
‖xt − xt+1‖.
Indeed, t = 1 follows from the definition of (x2, y2). We now assume the claim holds for T − 1 and
prove it for T :
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
=
T∑
t=1
Lt(xT+1, yT+1)
≤
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xT , yT+1) + LT (xT , yT+1) by Equation (2)
≤
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xT , yT ) + LT (xT , yT+1) by Equation (2)
≤
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1) +GL
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt − xt+1‖
+ LT (xT , yT+1) + LT (xT+1, yT+1)− LT (xT+1, yT+1) by induction claim
≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1) +GL
T∑
t=1
‖xt − xt+1‖ since LT is GL-Lipschitz.
Proof of Lemma 3. Fix t, define J(x, y) ,
∑t−1
τ=1 Lτ (x, y) + Lt(x, y) and notice it is tη -strongly
convex strongly concave with respect to norm ‖ · ‖. Also notice that (xt+1, yt+1) is the unique
saddle point of J(x, y).
By strong convexity of J and definition of xt+1 it holds that for any x ∈ X and any y ∈ Y
J(x, y) ≥ J(xt+1, y) +∇xJ(xt+1, y)>(x− xt+1) + t
2η
‖x− xt+1‖2.
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Plugging in y = yt+1 and recalling the KKT condition ∇xJ(xt+1, yt+1)>(x − xt+1) ≥ 0, we have
that for any x ∈ X
2η
t
[
J(x, yt+1)− J(xt+1, yt+1)
] ≥ ‖x− xt+1‖2. (10)
Similarly, since J is tη strongly concave. That is, for any y ∈ Y
J(xt+1, y) ≤ J(xt+1, yt+1) +∇yJ(xt+1, yt+1)>(y − yt+1)− t
2η
‖y − yt+1‖2.
Together with the KKT condition ∇yJ(xt+1, yt+1)>(y − yt+1) ≤ 0 we get that for any y ∈ Y
2η
t
[
J(xt+1, yt+1)− J(xt+1, y)
] ≥ ‖y − yt+1‖2. (11)
Adding up Equations (10) and (11), plugging x = xt and y = yt we get
2η
t
[
J(xt, yt+1)− J(xt+1, yt)
] ≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖y − yt+1‖2.
⇐⇒ 2η
t
[ t−1∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt, yt+1) + Lt(xt, yt+1)− [
t−1∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt+1, yt) + Lt(xt+1, yt)]
]
≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖y − yt+1‖2
=⇒ 2η
t
[ t−1∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt, yt) + Lt(xt, yt+1)− [
t−1∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt+1, yt) + Lt(xt+1, yt)]
]
≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖y − yt+1‖2,
since
∑t−1
τ=1 Lτ (xt, yt+1) ≤
∑t−1
τ=1 Lτ (xt, yt).
Additionally, since
∑t−1
τ=1 Lτ (xt, yt) ≤
∑t−1
τ=1 Lτ (xt+1, yt), we have
2η
t
[ t−1∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt, yt) + Lt(xt, yt+1)−
t−1∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt, yt)− Lt(xt+1, yt)
]
≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖y − yt+1‖2
⇐⇒ 2η
t
[Lt(xt, yt+1)− Lt(xt+1, yt)] ≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2
⇐⇒ 2η
t
[L¯t(xt, yt+1) + 1
η
RX(xt)− 1
η
RY (yt+1)− L¯t(xt+1, yt)− 1
η
RX(xt+1) +
1
η
RY (yt)
]
≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2
=⇒ 2η
t
[
GL¯‖[xt; yt+1]− [xt+1; yt]‖+
1
η
RX(xt)− 1
η
RX(xt+1) +
1
η
RY (yt)− 1
η
RY (yt+1)
]
≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2
=⇒ 2η
t
[
GL¯‖xt − xt+1‖+GL¯‖yt − yt+1‖+
1
η
RX(xt)− 1
η
RX(xt+1) +
1
η
RY (yt)− 1
η
RY (yt+1)
]
≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2
=⇒ 2η
t
[
GL¯‖xt − xt+1‖+GL¯‖yt − yt+1‖+
GRX
η
‖xt − xt+1‖+ GRY
η
‖yt − yt+1‖
]
≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2
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=⇒ 2η
t
[GL¯ +
1
η
max(GRX , GRY )]
[‖xt − xt+1‖+ ‖yt − yt+1‖] ≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2
⇐⇒ 2η
t
[GL¯ +
1
η
max(GRX , GRY )] ≥
‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2
‖xt − xt+1‖+ ‖yt − yt+1‖ .
Finally, since x2 is a convex function a
2
2 +
b2
2 ≥
(
a+b
2
)2
, we have a2 + b2 ≥ (a+b)22 . This, together
with the last implication, yields the result
4η
t
[GL¯ +
1
η
max(GRX , GRY )] ≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖+ ‖yt − yt+1‖.
Proof of Theorem 2.
T∑
t=1
L¯t(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x, y)
≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x, y) +
T∑
t=1
1
η
RY (yt) by Equation 6
≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) +
T∑
t=1
1
η
RY (yt) +
T
η
RX(xT+1) by Lemma 2
≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)−
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1) +
T∑
t=1
1
η
RY (yt) +
T
η
RX(xT+1) +GL
T∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖ by Lemma 3
≤
T∑
t=1
GL(‖xt − xt+1‖+ ‖yt − yt+1‖) +
T∑
t=1
1
η
RY (yt) +
T
η
RX(xT+1) +GL
T∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖
≤
T∑
t=1
GL(‖xt − xt+1‖+ ‖yt − yt+1‖) +
T∑
t=1
1
η
RY (yt) +
T
η
RX(xT+1) +GL
T∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖
≤ 2
T∑
t=1
GL(‖xt − xt+1‖+ ‖yt − yt+1‖) +
T∑
t=1
1
η
RY (yt) +
T
η
RX(xT+1)
≤ 2
T∑
t=1
GL(
4η
t
[GL¯ +
1
η
max(GRX , GRY )]) +
T∑
t=1
1
η
RY (yt) +
T
η
RX(xT+1)
≤ 8GLη[GL¯ +
1
η
max(GRX , GRY )](1 +
∫ T
1
1
t
dt) +
T∑
t=1
1
η
RY (yt) +
T
η
RX(xT+1)
≤ 8GLη[GL¯ +
1
η
max(GRX , GRY )](1 + ln(T )) +
T
η
max
y∈Y
RY (y) +
T
η
max
x∈X
RX(x)
≤ 8η[GL¯ +
1
η
max(GRX , GRY )]
2(1 + ln(T )) +
T
η
max
y∈Y
RY (y) +
T
η
max
x∈X
RX(x).
Notice that minx∈X maxy∈Y
∑T
t=1 L¯t(x, y) −
∑T
t=1 L¯t(xt, yt) can be upper bounded by the same
quantity using the same argument. This concludes the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 5. We need to find GR > 0 such that ‖∇R(x)‖∞ ≤ GR for all x ∈ ∆θ. Notice
that [∇R(x)]i = 1 + ln(xi) for i = 1, ...d. Moreover, since for every i = 1, ..., d we have θ ≤ xi ≤ 1
the following sequence of inequalities hold: ln(θ) ≤ 1 + ln(θ) ≤ 1 + ln(xi) ≤ 1. It follows that
GR = max{| ln(θ)|, 1}.
Proof of Lemma 6. Choose z∗ = [1; 0; 0; ...; 0; 0], it is easy to see that z∗p = [1− θ(d−1); θ; θ; ...; θ, θ]
and ‖z∗ − z∗p‖1 = 2θ(d− 1).
Proof of Lemma 7. Let (x∗, y∗) be any saddle point pair for
∑T
t=1 L¯t(x, y) with x∗ ∈ ∆, y∗ ∈ ∆.
Let (x∗θ, y
∗
θ) be any saddle point pair for
∑T
t=1 L¯t(x, y) with x∗θ ∈ ∆, y∗θ ∈ ∆. Let x∗p, y∗p be the
projection of x∗, y∗ onto the respective simplexes using the ‖ · ‖∞ norm. We first show the second
inequality. Notice that
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x∗, y∗) ≤
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x∗θ, y∗)
≤
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x∗θ, y∗p) +GL¯T‖y∗p − y∗‖1
≤
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x∗θ, y∗θ) +GL¯T‖y∗p − y∗‖1.
To show the first inequality in the statement of the lemma notice that
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x∗, y∗) ≥
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x∗, y∗θ)
≥
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x∗p, y∗θ)−GL¯T‖x∗p − x∗‖1
≥
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x∗θ, y∗θ)−GL¯T‖x∗p − x∗‖1.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. For convenience set L¯t(x, y) = x>Aty. Let (x∗, y∗) be any saddle point of
minx∈∆ maxy∈∆
∑T
t=1 x
>Aty, let (x∗p, y∗p) be the respective projections onto ∆θ using ‖ · ‖∞ norm.
By the choice of θ we have that | ln(θ)| > 1 additionally, notice that maxz∈∆θ
∑d
i=1 zi ln(zi)+ln(d) ≤
0 + ln(d) by Jensen’s inequality.
T∑
t=1
x>t Atyt −min
x∈∆
max
y∈∆
T∑
t=1
x>Aty
≤
T∑
t=1
x>t Atyt − min
x∈∆θ
max
y∈∆θ
T∑
t=1
x>Aty +GL¯T‖x∗ − x∗p‖1 by Lemma 7
≤
T∑
t=1
x>t Atyt − min
x∈∆θ
max
y∈∆θ
T∑
t=1
x>Aty + 2GL¯Tθ(d1 − 1) by Lemma 6
≤ 8η[GL¯ +
1
η
max(GRX , GRY )]
2(1 + ln(T )) +
T
η
max
y∈∆θ
RY (y) +
T
η
max
x∈∆θ
RX(x) + 2GL¯Tθ(d1 − 1) by Theorem 2
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≤ 8η[GL¯ +
| ln(θ)|
η
]2(1 + ln(T )) +
T
η
max
y∈∆θ
RY (y) +
T
η
max
x∈∆θ
RX(x) + 2GL¯Tθ(d1 − 1)
≤ 32ηG2L¯(1 + ln(T )) +
T
η
max
y∈∆θ
RY (y) +
T
η
max
x∈∆θ
RX(x) + 2GL¯Te
−ηGL¯(d1 − 1) by the choice of θ
≤ 32ηG2L¯(1 + ln(T )) +
T
η
ln(d2) +
T
η
ln(d1) + 2GL¯Te
−ηGL¯(d1 − 1)
≤ 32GL¯
√
T (1 + ln(T )) +
√
T (ln d1 + ln d2) + 2d1GL¯Te
−√T
= O
(
ln(T )
√
T +
√
T max{ln d1, ln d2}
)
+ o(1) max{d1, d2}.
The last line follows because GL¯ ≤ 1, since each entry of A is bounded between [−1, 1]. A sym-
metrical argument yields the other side of the inequality.
Proof of Lemma 9.
E[
T∑
t=1
x>t Aˆtyt]
= E[
T−1∑
t=1
x>t Aˆtyt] + E[x>T AˆT yT ]
= E[
T−1∑
t=1
x>t Aˆtyt] + E[E[x>T AˆT yT |τ = 1, ..., T − 1]]
= E[
T−1∑
t=1
x>t Aˆtyt] + E[x>TE[AˆT |τ = 1, ..., T − 1]yT ]
= E[
T−1∑
t=1
x>t Aˆtyt] + E[x>TAT yT ] by Theorem 4.
Repeating the argument T − 1 more times yields the result.
Proof of Lemma 10. Let us fist bound |∑Tt=1 x>Aty −∑Tt=1 x>Aˆty| for any x ∈ ∆X and y ∈ ∆Y
with probability 1.
|
T∑
t=1
x>Aty −
T∑
t=1
x>Aˆty|
= |x>(
T∑
t=1
Aty −
T∑
t=1
Aˆty)|
≤ ‖x‖2‖
T∑
t=1
Aty − Aˆty‖2
≤ ‖
T∑
t=1
Aty − Aˆty‖2
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It now follows that
T∑
t=1
x>Aˆty ≤
T∑
t=1
x>Aty + ‖
T∑
t=1
Aty − Aˆty‖2
=⇒ min
x∈∆X,δ
T∑
t=1
x>Aˆty ≤
T∑
t=1
x>Aty + ‖
T∑
t=1
Aty − Aˆty‖2 ∀x ∈ ∆X,δ, y ∈ ∆Y,δ
=⇒ min
x∈∆X,δ
T∑
t=1
x>Aˆty ≤ max
y∈∆Y,δ
T∑
t=1
x>Aty + ‖
T∑
t=1
Aty − Aˆty‖2 ∀x ∈ ∆X,δ, y ∈ ∆Y,δ
=⇒ max
y∈∆Y,δ
min
x∈∆X,δ
T∑
t=1
x>Aˆty ≤ min
x∈∆X,δ
max
y∈∆Y,δ
T∑
t=1
x>Aty + ‖
T∑
t=1
Aty − Aˆty‖2 ∀x ∈ ∆X,δ, y ∈ ∆Y,δ.
This concludes the proof as maxy∈∆Y,δ minx∈∆X,δ
∑T
t=1 x
>Aˆty = minx∈∆X,δ maxy∈∆Y,δ
∑T
t=1 x
>Aˆty
(since the function is convex-concave and the sets ∆δY and ∆
δ
X are convex and compact), the other
side of the inequality can be obtained using the other inequality follows from applying the same
reasoning.
Proof of Lemma 11. For any y define αt , Aty − Aˆty. We first show that for all t, t′ such that
t < t′ it holds that E[α>t αt′ ] = 0. Indeed
E[α>t αt′ ] = E[(Aty − Aˆty)>(At′y − Aˆt′y)]
= E[(Aty)>At′y − (Aty)>Aˆt′y − (Aˆty)>At′y + (Aˆty)>Aˆt′y]
= (Aty)
>At′y − (Aty)>At′y − (Aty)>At′y + E[(Aˆty)>Aˆt′y]
= (Aty)
>At′y − (Aty)>At′y − (Aty)>At′y + (Aty)>At′y
= 0,
where the second to last line follows since
E[(Aˆty)>Aˆt′y] = E1,...,t′−1[E[(Aˆty)>Aˆt′y|τ = 1, ..., t′ − 1]]
= E1,...,t′−1[(Aˆty)>E[Aˆt′y|τ = 1, ..., t′ − 1]]
= E1,...,t′−1[(Aˆty)>At′y]
= (Aty)
>At′y.
Now,
E[‖
T∑
t=1
Aty − Aˆty‖2] =
√√√√E[‖ T∑
t=1
αt‖2]2
≤
√√√√E[‖ T∑
t=1
αt‖22] by Jensen’s Inequality
=
√√√√ T∑
t=1
E[‖αt‖22] + 2
∑
t<t′
E[α>t αt′ ]
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=√√√√ T∑
t=1
E[‖Aty − Aˆty‖22]
≤
√√√√ T∑
t=1
E[2‖Aty‖2 + 2‖Aˆty‖22]
We proceed to bound ‖Aˆty‖2, the upper bound we obtain will also bound ‖Aty‖ because of the
following fact. If the random vector a˜ satisfies ‖a˜‖ ≤ c for some constant c with probability 1 then
‖Ea˜‖ ≤ c. Indeed by Jensen’s inequality we have that ‖Ea˜‖ ≤ E‖a˜‖ ≤ c. Let us omit the subscript
t for the rest of the proof. Let Aˆ[i,:] be the i-th row of matrix Aˆ.
‖Aˆy‖2 =
√√√√ d1∑
i=1
[ d2∑
j=1
aˆi,jyj
]2
≤
d1∑
i=1
√√√√[ d2∑
j=1
aˆi,jyj
]2
=
d1∑
i=1
∣∣ d2∑
j=1
aˆi,jyj
∣∣
≤
d1∑
i=1
‖Aˆ[i,:]‖∞‖y‖1 by generalized Cauchy Schwartz
≤ d1 max
i,j
|Ai,j
δ2
| by definition of Aˆ and using the fact that xt ∈ ∆X,δ and yt ∈ ∆Y,δ
≤ d1
δ2
.
Notice the upper bound d2
δ2
can also be obtained by interchanging the summations and repeating
the argument. This yields the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 5. We first focus on one side of the inequality,
E[
T∑
t=1
e>x,tAtey,t −min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
x>Aty]
= E[
T∑
t=1
e>x,tAtey,t]− E[min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
x>Aty]
= E[
T∑
t=1
x>t Atyt]− E[min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
x>Aty] by Lemma 8
= E[
T∑
t=1
x>t Atyt]− E[ min
x∈∆δX
max
y∈∆δY
T∑
t=1
x>Aty] + 2δG
‖·‖1
L¯ (d1 − 1)T by Lemmas 6 and 7
≤ E[
T∑
t=1
x>t Atyt]− E[ min
x∈∆δX
max
y∈∆δY
T∑
t=1
x>Aˆty] +
2
√
T min(d1, d2)
δ2
+ 2δG
‖·‖1
L¯ (d1 − 1)T by Lemmas 10 and 11
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≤ E[
T∑
t=1
x>t Aˆtyt]− E[ min
x∈∆δX
max
y∈∆δY
T∑
t=1
x>Aˆty] +
2
√
T min(d1, d2)
δ2
+ 2δG
‖·‖1
L¯ (d1 − 1)T by Lemma 9
≤ 8η[G‖·‖1Lˆ +
| ln(δ)|
η
]2(1 + ln(T )) +
T
η
(ln(d1) + ln(d2))
+
2
√
T min(d1, d2)
δ2
+ 2δG
‖·‖1
L¯ (d1 − 1)T as in the proof of Theorem 3
= 8η[
1
δ2
+
| ln(δ)|
η
]2(1 + ln(T )) +
T
η
(ln(d1) + ln(d2)) +
2
√
T min(d1, d2)
δ2
+ 2δ(d1 − 1)T by Lemma 1
= O((d1 + d2) ln(T )T
5/6) after plugging in δ =
1
T 1/6
, η = T 1/6
The other side of the inequality follows by a symmetrical argument.
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